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Abstract 
Regional economic divergence has become a threat to economic progress, social cohesion 
and political stability in Europe. Market processes and policies that are supposed to spread 
prosperity and opportunity are no longer sufficiently effective. The evidence points to the 
existence of several different modes of regional economic performance in Europe, responding 
to different development challenges and opportunities. Both mainstream and heterodox 
theories have gaps in their ability to explain the existence of these different regional 
trajectories and the weakness of the convergence processes among them. Therefore, a 
different approach is required, one that strengthens Europe’s strongest regions but develops 
new approaches to promote opportunity in industrial declining and less-developed regions. 
There is ample new theory and evidence to support such an approach, which we have labelled 
‘place-sensitive distributed development policy’.  
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1. THE CHALLENGE 
 
“Regional inequality is proving too politically dangerous to ignore”  
The Economist, 17 December 2016 
 
In the European Union (EU) in the new millennium, inequality among regions
1
 has turned sharply up. 
This is not uniquely a European problem, but one common to many countries, both developed and 
developing – for example, the inequality in income per person among US metropolitan areas was 30% 
higher in 2016 than in 1980 (Ganong and Shoag, 2015).  
Since the late 1970s a combination of globalisation and technological change (and some policy 
choices) have generated what are known as the ‘great inversion’ and the ‘new geography of jobs’ 
(Moretti, 2012; Storper, 2013). The inversion concerns the fact that many rural regions and middle-to-
small metropolitan areas that were once quite prosperous have been characterised by a combination of 
job loss, declining labour-force participation or declining per-capita income relative to the national 
average. In some others, employment may be increasing but on average is not of high quality, 
comprising routine and relatively less-skilled jobs. Centres of small and medium-sized manufacturing 
cities continue to suffer from a decline in employment or relative income, while their surrounding 
suburban or rural areas are characterised by income stagnation.  
In contrast, many large metropolitan areas, including their suburbs, are now among the most 
dynamic in terms of income and employment creation. In Europe, in particular, the panorama is 
complex. On the one hand, the increasingly familiar dichotomy persists between dynamic large urban 
agglomerations and stagnating industrialised and remote regions. Many industrial declining and/or 
peripheral regions have suffered a steady long-term decline in employment and competitiveness, 
whereas the inner areas of some large metropolitan regions have gained greater shares of high-wage 
jobs. On the other hand, a number of capital metro regions have been hard hit by the crisis, while 
some rural and intermediate regions have displayed more resilience (Dijkstra et al., 2015). The result 
is a finely grained, multi-scale territorial patchwork of diverging real incomes and rates of labour 
force participation: between states and regions; within regions, between core areas and peripheral 
areas; and between prosperous metropolitan regions and less-prosperous ones. This article combines 
evidence and theory to rethink the policy framework for regional economic development in the EU. 
Recent changes in inter-regional inequality require reconsidering the usual frameworks underlying 
policy, and especially the standard people-versus-place division in policy formulation. In order to 
achieve this, we begin by presenting evidence showing that the overall growth in inter-regional 
inequality is underpinned by the existence of several groups of regional economies in Europe that are 
structurally very different from one another. Theory predicts that slow convergence in an integrated 
economic area such as the EU will come about from some combination of diffusion processes 
(knowledge, de-agglomeration) and labour mobility. These mechanisms, however, are no longer 
working to trigger economic convergence. Strong barriers to territorial development have been 
erected in terms of skill structures and formal and informal institutions. Inter-regional inequality and 
the breakdown of prosperity and convergence mechanisms are not only an economic problem, but 
have become a source of social and political instability for the EU and its member states. Our success 
or failure at solving these problems will shape Europe’s political and economic future.  
In order to create a policy framework that is addressed to these realities of different structural 
development groups with weak convergence and diffusion mechanisms, we argue in the second part 
of this article that standard distinctions or trade-offs between so-called ‘people-based’ policies 
(mobility, education, etc.) and ‘place-based’ approaches (job development, innovation support, etc.) 
                                                 
1
  Throughout the paper the level 2 of the EU Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics (NUTS-2) is used 
when referring to European regions. 
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should be replaced by ‘place-sensitive’ frameworks based on integrated micro (individual) – meso 
(territorial) logics of tackling diverse development trajectories. Moreover, policy should embrace the 
goal of achieving (or enhancing) development in all types of regions, but not be based on any 
formulaic notions of convergence or redistribution. This kind of framework is distinctive from, but 
potentially complementary to, other current EU regional policy approaches and instruments.  
 
2. EVIDENCE: DEVELOPMENT GROUPS OF EUROPE’S REGIONS 
The interaction of economy-wide forces and regional characteristics creates a geography made up of 
countries, regions and city-regions that are at different structural positions in the wider economy’s 
ladder of roles and functions (Scott and Storper, 2003). The issue is not whether, at any particular 
moment, there is perfect convergence or equality in development levels: there never is. But rather 
whether the economy is spreading prosperity or concentrating it. 
A summary indicator of development and prosperity is per capita personal income, or its close 
cousin, GDP per head. GDP per head for the economy of any given country, region or city-region is a 
good indicator of many of its key characteristics. Economies at similar income levels often share 
many structural attributes, including education levels, science and technology endowments, 
infrastructure and institutional quality. Conversely, between economies with dissimilar income levels, 
these structural attributes tend to differ significantly. Consequently, nations, cities and regions can be 
grouped according to their levels of development. These groups differ systematically across a number 
of dimensions. 
A very-high-income economy, for example, is characterised by high average wages and labour 
force participation, whereas a low-income economy has low average wages. The high-income 
economy stays ahead of cost competition from below by continuing to innovate or capture innovative, 
high-growth sectors. The advantage held by a low-income economy is that it can mobilise relatively 
lower-cost capital and labour to capture activities susceptible to being delocalised or off-shored, in 
search of cost compression. Middle-income regions, as we shall see, face a particular challenge 
because they are neither cheap nor extravagantly innovative or productive. Each development group 
has specific needs and challenges related to its starting point and its near- to medium-term prospects 
in relation to those of other groups.  
There are some generic lessons about development that apply to all economies. Traditional 
approaches generally suggest that less-wealthy groups should somehow become like the more-
wealthy ones and vice versa: rich places should become cheaper while poor places more productive. 
A financial centre such as Frankfurt (DE) and an old manufacturing city such as Lille (FR) must, in 
theory, converge in their economic structure, but their near- and medium-term perspectives and tasks 
are profoundly different from one another. Thus, grouping economies directly addresses the uneven 
pattern of development and the core questions of sustaining competitiveness in leading regions while 
enhancing prosperity in other regions, and in particular overcoming the barriers that exist in the less-
favoured areas.  
For this analysis of EU regions, we distinguish four groups: very high GDP per head (VH) 
regions, with 150% of EU average or greater (and in the national analysis, 150% of national average 
or greater); high GDP/head (H) regions, with 120-149% of EU or national averages; medium 
GDP/head (M) regions, with 75-119%; and low GDP/head (L) regions, with less than 75% of EU or 
national averages.  
Map 1 shows the four economic development groups. The VH group encompasses a number of 
large cities – many of them national capitals – at the core of Europe, while the H group has its centre 
in the Alpine area, but involves a large number of cities and national capitals elsewhere in the EU. A 
large middle-income group (the M group) embraces the majority of the western side of the EU, while 
the L group comprises the low-income regions to the south and east.  
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Map 1: Classifying European regions according to their level of development 
 
  
European regions according to their level of development 
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Figure 1: Groups by total population change (2000-2014) 
  
 
The demographic and labour market characteristics of these four groups differ markedly and shed 
light on the variety of challenges each faces. Figure 1 reveals that total population change follows the 
group gradient: people are going to higher-income areas and, in the case of the least developed 
regions, more are leaving than staying. Online Map A1 confirms this relationship by mapping the 
geography of GDP per capita and population growth.  
Figure 2: GDP per head EU index (2013) vs. employment change (2001-14) 
  
Figure 2 shows that employment has declined in the L group, remained essentially stagnant in the 
M group, and grown moderately in H and VH regions. Employment creation has been low in Europe 
as a whole, with the only exception of the very prosperous regions. Online MapA2 shows the detailed 
geography of GDP per capita and employment change.  
Most of the regions in the H group have high rates of employment (labour force participation), 
although there are some (mostly Italian and Spanish) exceptions to this pattern. Online Map A3 
pictures regions according to GDP per capita and their employment rate. Mirroring this, 
unemployment rates reflect diverse development patterns: some high-performing regions, especially 
metropolitan ones, have substantial ‘flow’ or turnover, while the M and L groups have higher 
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unemployment, which comprises more long-term unemployment than that in the VH and H groups 
because of differences in the structure of labour turnover (Figure 3). 
Figure 3: GDP per head EU index (2013) vs. unemployment rate (2015) 
 
As expected, the interaction between employment and demography is reflected in labour 
productivity dynamics – the key way in which demography, employment and income come together. 
Online Map A4 depicts the geography of regions according to GDP per head and the growth of GDP 
per head. Many of Europe’s most prosperous regions experience increases in productivity. In some 
cases – as in a number of central and eastern European regions – productivity is rising against a 
backdrop of shrinking population, which may become problematic in the future. In parts of France, by 
contrast, there is a positive dynamic of population and productivity, even though the level of 
GDP/capita is around the EU average.  
Online Maps A5 and A6 separate regions according to the differences in their GDP per head and 
the EU average and, respectively, employment change in industry and in services. They reveal that 
changes in industrial (manufacturing) and service employment relative to GDP also reflect the 
growing economic divide among regions. The continent’s core high-income regions (especially 
Germany) are supported by high-performing manufacturing productions. However, this is not true for 
metropolitan capitals such as London and Paris. On the other hand, manufacturing regions are 
characterised by routine-based production that has reduced employment due to technology and 
globalisation. Online Map A7 pictures regions according to GDP per capita and patenting, showing 
that routine manufacturing regions have suffered a decline in competitiveness relative to high-income 
specialised manufacturing regions, which are those hosting high-end innovative manufacturing. Areas 
with high income and innovative manufacturing are also often dynamic in service growth, because 
manufacturing and highly skilled, knowledge-intensive services are strongly complementary in 
today’s economy. Low growth in services in many of the poorly performing regions is a sign of this 
complementarity. Europe has an advantage in both manufacturing and services in its high productivity 
and income regions. The only real exception to this is growth in some dynamic but low-skilled 
services, such as tourism, in regions with good natural amenities – e.g. sun and sea – as well as in 
areas with comparative advantages in cultural amenities. 
Finally, Map 2 and the accompanying Online Table A1 identify what we call “overperforming” 
and “underperforming” regions. Regional performance reflects a general national effect, and a 
regional effect, and thus they identify regions in each group according to whether they are above or 
below the national average for their respective Member State. These data deliver three major insights.  
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Map 2: Over-performers and underperformers (2001-2013) 
 
 
First, strong regional effects are in evidence, with many EU regions performing better or worse 
than their national averages. This means that overall EU and national dynamics are not exclusively 
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driving regional performance and confirms that the regional level is a distinct and highly variegated 
scale of economic development with overall divergence processes at work. The regional question 
really is at the heart of Europe’s economic future.  
Second, as in the rest of the world, there is a core of leading regions in Europe, comprising a set 
of major metropolitan (often capital) regions in many countries and a few dynamic core areas in 
Benelux, southern Germany-Austria-northern Italy.  
Third is a cautionary note on how to distinguish between over-performing and underperforming 
regions. There are some countries in the EU that are more evenly developed than others. In a high-
income but evenly-developed country (relatively low inter-regional GDP variance), such as Austria, a 
map of underperformance or over-performance means less than a similar map for France, Spain, Italy 
or the UK. The wide incidence of underperforming regions reflects a high baseline level of variance 
and therefore translates, on the ground, to a worse relative performance in their weaker regions than in 
Austria.  
 
3. THE FOUR GROUPS OF REGIONS: A SYNTHESIS  
The very-high (VH) income group of regions is dominated by large metropolitan and capital city-
regions and includes several additional regions, generally highly urbanized in the form of a network 
of cities (e.g. Rhine-Ruhr or Randstad Holland), specialized in high quality goods and services. Many 
of these regions are attracting population (with the noted exception of Germany), although some have 
high unemployment rates and underperformed since the beginning of the financial crisis (Dijkstra et 
al., 2015). Most of them have high productivity growth. Overall, this group of leading regions is 
generating more than its share of European wealth (Map 2).  
The high-income (H) group shares many, but not all, characteristics of the VH group. These 
regions are less metropolitan or city-centred and somewhat less dynamic demographically. Their 
employment rates are high and many have satisfactory productivity growth. However, South-East 
England, Benelux, northern Italy and Catalonia are doing less well than many German members of the 
group. This means that the H group can be divided into two: a more innovative part and another less 
so.  
The medium-income (M) group is vast and comprises most parts of northwestern Europe that 
remain outside the VH and H groups. There are two broad sub-groups within this category. The 
largest covers regions that have lost manufacturing jobs, which is reflected in stagnant or declining 
employment rates. Population growth is low or even in decline in some of these regions, so 
unemployment rates vary. Education levels – attainment of secondary and tertiary education – are 
below those of the H and VH groups. Overall, these are economically fragile regions, displaying a 
combination of declining manufacturing, unsatisfactory attainment of education and skills, and 
inadequate labour-force participation. The second sub-group stands out because it is experiencing 
population growth. Such in-migration brings income (via people-based fiscal transfers in the form of 
pensions and health benefits), and spending has a local multiplier effect, mainly in the demand for 
services. Labour-force participation, however, remains low. More importantly, the types of 
employment stimulated, in mostly non-tradeable local services, involve limited skill development, 
innovation potential, and export-ability. All this depresses the per-capita income benefit of such 
employment gains. However, there is a wide dispersion of productivity in services among regions and 
countries, with French M regions enjoying the highest levels (though with perhaps an employment-
reducing effect).  
The low-income (L) group consists of large swathes of eastern and southern Europe. These 
regions share some common characteristics in terms of low employment rates and poor quality of 
government, low investment in R&D and a relative lack of accessibility. They have also experienced 
divergent economic trajectories in recent years. This has led the European Commission (2017) in its 
Lagging regions report to distinguish between ‘low-income’ and ‘low-growth’ regions. Low-income 
regions are mainly located in central and eastern Europe and have a real GDP per head below 50% of 
the European average. Many of these regions have higher education levels than some of the southern 
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and western L group members, but have lost population: they are experiencing the consequences of 
their entry into both the EU and the world economy. Their skilled people have been out-migrating, 
generating a vicious circle of population and talent loss that is creating spatial traps for those who 
remain. Barriers to entrepreneurship and low levels of innovation are also limiting their participation 
in cross-EU value chains. Low-growth regions instead stretch along the southern fringe of the EU and 
“cover less-developed and transition regions (regions with GDP per capita up to 90% of the EU 
average) that did not converge to the EU average between the years 2000 and 2013 in Member States 
with a GDP per head in PPS below the EU average in 2013” (EU, 2017: 1). They have better 
endowments in infrastructure, but suffer from skill shortages and a lack of capacity within the 
economic fabric to produce and assimilate innovation. These different trajectories and challenges 
mean that the pursuit of effective policies would, in all likelihood, require different development 
strategies for low-income and low-growth regions. 
The few western EU regions in the group – including West Wales and the Valleys or Tees Valley 
and Durham in the UK – are those with long-standing issues related to productivity, specialisation, 
skills and labour force participation. Today, they are characterised by educational deficiencies when 
compared to more prosperous parts of their own countries and the EU as a whole.  
Overall, each group offers a distinctive set of attributes and near-term developmental constraints 
and opportunities; this is the basis for the place-sensitive policy approach we define below. But before 
doing so, it is important to review what theory has to say about such developmental inequalities and 
the mechanisms it identifies for reducing them.  
 
4. THEORY: DOES IT OFFER A GUIDE ON HOW TO OVERCOME REGIONAL 
INEQUALITY?  
Current regional disparities are the outcome of two groups of forces. The first is the long-cycle of 
development in the economic structure, consisting of a major wave of technological progress that 
began in the 1970s. This stimulated output based on cutting-edge technologies, finance and advanced 
services that depend on agglomeration economies and whose core non-routine jobs favour large 
metropolitan areas and draw from pools of skilled workers in high-turnover labour markets. This 
wave of technological change also reduced employment in many previously dominant manufacturing 
sectors through automation, and has cut the cost of business-to-business trade within their value 
chains, enabling industries to become more geographically dispersed (Levy and Murnane, 2005). 
These long-cycle technological changes have coupled with an expansion in world trade and a 
lowering of trade barriers. Together, these transformations discourage employment – especially 
quality employment – creation at some intermediate and, particularly, lower-skill echelons, whilst 
enhancing job opportunities for those with the highest skills. As different skill types have increasingly 
become concentrated in different places, recent trends have favoured metropolitan regions, often at 
the expense of intermediate and peripheral areas. 
The second type of force is the long-cycle of regional evolutionary features, consisting of place-
specific endowments of people and skills, firms and industries, formal and informal institutions, 
capacities for innovation, and their reaction to change. The changing structure of the economy 
interacts with the characteristics of regions to generate patterns of development. At certain points in 
the past, this interaction has provided strong opportunities for lifting less-developed regions upwards, 
in a process of inter-regional convergence. However, since the 1970s, and especially in the new 
millennium, it has led to divergence. This is because the current long wave of development facilitates 
the geographical concentration of the best jobs and most innovative activities. But it is also because 
migration between regions has slowed down, and certain kinds of ‘traps’ have emerged in the less-
favoured regions, comprising a mixture of low incomes and skills, low labour-force participation, 
institutions that stifle development, and social dysfunction in the form of despair, withdrawal from 
economic life, and health problems.  
These large-scale structural forces are generating a huge challenge to theory and policy. In an 
article dated 27 December 2016, The Economist observed that “orthodox economics has few answers 
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to the problem of regional inequality”. In this section, we identify the gaps in orthodox theory and, 
with the resulting insights, we highlight the elements of a policy framework that could provide some 
of these answers.  
 
4.1 SHOULD WE FOCUS ON EFFICIENCY FIRST? 
The importance of agglomeration economies  
Traditional economic approaches based on neoclassical growth theory have mostly posited that policy 
intervention targeting less prosperous regions is not necessary. Perfect competition and factor 
mobility yield constant or diminishing returns to scale in large, wealthy regions, because of 
congestion and high land and labour costs. The expected outcome is diffusion of prosperity to other 
regions, generating either convergence in real incomes and opportunities, or at least some kind of 
maximisation of utilities through a best-possible geographical arbitraging of wages and amenities on 
the part of firms and households (Glaeser, 2008). It appears, however, that the functioning of market 
forces in the past few decades in Europe – including technological change, globalisation and 
European integration – have not led to improvements in economic performance for declining and less-
dynamic areas, but rather to concentration of wealth in the H and VH groups. European integration 
has done little to alleviate within-country territorial differences (Dunford and Perrons, 1994; Dunford 
and Smith, 2000; Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi, 2007; Cuadrado-Roura et al., 2016), which have 
worsened after the economic and financial crisis (Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi, 2016).  
Hence, there is a need look at territorial disparities and the trade-off between efficiency and 
equity from a different perspective. In this respect, a set of newer theories – endogenous growth, new 
economic geography (NEG) and evolutionary economic geography – are generating major questions 
about the dispersion processes at the heart of neoclassical growth theory, by demonstrating that 
agglomeration forces can be dominant in economic geography.  
In Europe since the 1980s, the rise of new economy industries, such as IT, advanced services, 
finance and global markets for quality-oriented goods, inter alia, have strengthened agglomeration 
economies and the advantages of city-regions. With these agglomeration forces, migration shifted to 
cities, especially larger ones, reinforcing a talent divide between high-income places and other 
regions, in spite of national policies to diffuse educational opportunities spatially. This wave of 
economy-wide forces is still gathering strength and strong agglomeration economies keep on drawing 
in skilled labour and strengthening networked ecologies of innovation and production.  
There is a consensus that greater agglomeration generates the positive externalities that lie behind 
the dynamism of large cities and regions and make them motors of economic growth (Fujita et al., 
1999; Duranton and Puga, 2001). Agglomeration is also considered to lead to greater innovation 
(Cooke and Morgan, 1994; Iammarino, 2005) and to lower barriers and costs of knowledge sharing 
and transmission across individual and firm networks (Storper and Venables, 2004; Iammarino and 
McCann, 2010). Europe is no exception: large cities, often combining economic functions with 
political ones as capitals of their respective countries, have, despite a few exceptions, performed well.  
Based on this evidence, spatially uneven development is often regarded as the price to pay for 
economy-wide productivity maximisation. That is the view posited in Glaeser’s Triumph of the City 
(Glaeser, 2011: 1): “Urban density provides the clearest path from poverty to prosperity”. As 
productivity increases and returns to innovative investment are higher in big cities than anywhere else 
(Combes et al., 2012), investing in metropolitan areas is deemed the best way to promote growth and 
create opportunities for individuals. This drives migration towards big cities resulting in: a) increasing 
density in large agglomerations, sparking additional positive externalities and growth; and b) creating 
more opportunities for people to leave smaller cities and less-developed regions. Abundant empirical 
evidence has been provided on the positive relationship between city size and productivity, 
innovativeness and entrepreneurship in advanced economies (Glaeser and Kerr, 2009; De la Roca and 
Puga, 2017).  
11 
 
This positive relationship today between urban density and productivity gives rise to an 
increasing split between large urban areas and other regions. From there, however, things get murkier. 
Among city-regions, productivity effects are not linearly linked to size (Iammarino and McCann, 
2015). Across developed countries, the relationship between city size and productivity adopts a U–
shaped form (OECD, 2006). This mixed evidence supports the idea that it is not just size, but other 
characteristics of cities that are increasingly selectively distributed – such as knowledge accumulation 
(Storper, 2013), creativity (Florida, 2005), innovation (Acs, 2002), cultural diversity (Lee and Nathan, 
2010) and institutions (Storper et al., 2015) – which are equally important for competitive advantages 
and economic growth. In the USA, for example, the productivity of city-regions reaches a maximum 
at the 7-8 million level (San Francisco, Washington, Boston), before declining in the biggest city-
regions such as New York or Los Angeles.  
The European city-system has some additional specificities. The benefits of agglomeration across 
European countries are similar, albeit slightly smaller, to those found in the USA (Ciccone, 2002). 
Some wealthy countries perform very well without very large cities (e.g. Germany, the Nordics), 
while in others national performance often depends on very big cities (e.g. France, UK). Moreover, 
middle-sized cities play a more important role in the EU than in the other developed parts of the world 
(Dijkstra et al., 2015), and this pattern is compatible with high levels of economic development in 
many EU countries. The jury is therefore out on whether the benefits of agglomeration can be 
achieved through a more even distribution of middle-sized agglomerations, i.e. on the exact spatial 
layout and distribution of agglomeration benefits (Crescenzi et al., 2007, 2012), and this is an 
important element for any policy framework. 
In most standard theory, uneven spatial development is seen as a price to be paid for better 
overall economic performance (aggregate productivity and income maximization). At this point, a 
second set of claims is introduced into this framework, which is that such a system also has spatial 
and social trickle-down (or diffusion) effects through knowledge spillovers to less-favoured regions 
and labour migration to more prosperous places. Unfortunately, these two mechanisms do not work as 
envisioned in the theoretical framework.  
 
Knowledge spillovers  
“When the economy moves from dispersion to agglomeration, innovation follows at a much faster 
pace. As a consequence, even those who stay put in the periphery are better off than under dispersion, 
provided that the growth effect triggered by the agglomeration is strong enough” (Fujita and Thisse, 
2003: 121). This phrase captures a key element of NEG theories of growth: the compensation 
mechanism (both inter-personal and inter-regional) acting from spatially concentrated economic 
growth through the diffusion of knowledge or, as it is commonly known, spatial knowledge spillovers. 
Knowledge creation – often proxied by one partial formal input indicator, i.e. R&D – breeds 
inequality, while knowledge diffusion – through linkages and networks – spreads opportunities. 
However, empirical evidence suggests that for the last decades spatial spillovers have been 
weaker than knowledge concentration, meaning that knowledge diffusion has not been strong enough 
to provide better opportunities for people remaining in lagging-behind regions (Martin and Sunley, 
1998; Dunford and Smith, 2000). The strong weight economic theory attributes to R&D investment as 
an ‘input to growth’ has resulted in overestimating the role that such intangible investments can play 
in many regions (Iammarino and McCann, 2013; Lee and Rodríguez-Pose, 2013).  
Research on knowledge spillovers has not yet fully identified the mechanisms by which the main 
knowledge flows occur across countries and regions (Breschi and Lissoni, 2001). Geographical 
proximity within and between regions (i.e. spatial interaction) per se does not automatically induce 
knowledge spillovers or innovation diffusion. Instead, it seems that additional conditions must be 
fulfilled, ranging from the existence of strong organisational channels (such as firms), to dense 
knowledge community networks and skills, for knowledge to travel (Breschi and Lissoni, 2001; 
Boschma, 2005; D’Este et al., 2013). Consequently, less dynamic cities and regions cannot benefit 
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from knowledge spillovers unless many types of transmission channels – cognitive, institutional, 
organisation and social – can be significantly enhanced (Boschma, 2005).  
One key type of channel, the multinational corporation, has both centralising and diffusing 
effects on knowledge distribution. As Hymer (1972:124) argues, “geographical specialisation will 
come to reflect the hierarchy of corporate decision-making, and the occupational distribution of 
labour in a city or region will depend upon its function in the international economic system”. Cross-
border corporate network-based organisation of production has contributed to both economic 
integration and isolation. Rising spatial (and individual) inequality due to the concentration of power 
and value creation in certain cities and regions in advanced economies has paired with the widespread 
diffusion of low-tier activities towards certain places in lagging-behind regions and developing 
countries (Iammarino and McCann, 2013, 2018; Crescenzi and Iammarino, 2017).  
Thus, whilst trade diffuses routinized and codified (economically ubiquitous) knowledge, a 
hierarchy of knowledge creation and non-routine activities is becoming more evident. Knowledge that 
is not economically or geographically ubiquitous generates innovative rents and requires high-skilled 
employment to be both deployed and further developed. Agglomeration and hierarchies of regional 
systems (Cantwell and Iammarino, 2003), and greater divergence among groups of regions (Storper, 
1997) are the result of these processes. Global value chains, in principle diffusion mechanisms, also 
strengthen localized impacts for specific types of workers that are exposed to offshoring and 
outsourcing, further spurring polarisation and divergence (Autor et al., 2013; Gagliardi et al., 2015).  
 
Labour mobility  
A second potential mechanism, expected both to even out divergence and enhance the trickle-down 
effects of agglomeration, is labour migration. In recent times, however, labour mobility has failed to 
bring about these predicted effects: a steep decline in internal low-skilled migration has been recorded 
in a number of European countries (e.g. Eurofound, 2015). Simultaneously, international low-skilled 
mobility in economic integrated areas, such as the EU or NAFTA, is becoming jeopardised by rising 
restrictions on people flows (Partridge et al., 2012; Molloy et al., 2014; Barslund et al., 2015).  
A vigorous debate is emerging on the nature and causes of the migration slowdown. Its potential 
causes include: growing gaps in inter-regional house prices; double-income couples, resulting from 
higher female employment rates; job search at distance using ICT; and the changing nature of skills. 
While there are undoubtedly interactions between these potential causes, the changing nature of skills 
appears to be particularly important and, as yet, insufficiently studied. Recent research has affirmed 
that returns to education increasingly diverge across labour markets. Skill-biased technological 
change is driving the skilled to skilled regions, while movement by the less-skilled is increasingly 
constrained by barriers to moving or getting into prosperous regions (Diamond, 2016; Giannone, 
2017). This has led some to call for rethinking the nature of skills in the new economy (Deming, 
2015). While more formal skills are required than ever before for many jobs in the new economy, 
more experience-based skills are also needed and can only be acquired by ‘being there’ (De la Roca 
and Puga, 2017). New economy skills are more social and collaborative compared to manual jobs or 
routine industrial ones. This reasoning implies that even those individuals who succeed at formal 
schooling in less-developed regions are increasingly disadvantaged by their location. They are less apt 
to acquire the informal experience, knowledge and cues, and to build networks that create advantages 
for similarly educated individuals in the wealthier regions. If this is the case, then institutions in the 
wealthier regions can also give their students better overall capacities via networking and social 
cueing. We are a long way from a world with sufficient labour mobility to give the less skilled the 
opportunities of dynamic regions, or where the skilled are likely to take their knowledge to the less-
prosperous ones.  
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Physical connectivity 
Since at least the 1989 reform of the Structural Funds, European Cohesion Policy has invested 
considerable resources in preparing the EU’s less-developed regions for greater integration and more 
competition. About half of the Structural Funds invested in the EU’s less-developed regions has 
targeted infrastructure deficits, particularly those in transport infrastructure (Crescenzi and Rodríguez-
Pose, 2012). This has greatly improved the physical connectivity of Europe’s lagging areas, but the 
effort has not always translated into more jobs, greater productivity or economic growth. This is 
because increased connectivity raises aggregate attractiveness, but also reinforces differentials in 
attractiveness.  
Connected places are not just better positioned to exploit their hitherto latent comparative 
advantages, but are also subject to the re-centralisation of resources and knowledge because of 
reduced transport costs to serve less densely-populated regions. Differences in capabilities and 
agglomeration effects among places is why, for example, a high-speed train line between two very 
unequal territories often reinforces centralisation and can lead to de-industrialisation, fewer locally 
provided services, and a decline in local commerce in areas that, de facto, become annexed 
hinterlands of the more powerful regions (Puga, 2002).  
 
The power of centralisation effects over diffusion  
We can summarise this discussion by noting that the current wave of development of the wider 
economy has weak diffusion mechanisms of the type that would be required to spread prosperity to 
other regions and bring about income convergence. In the middle of the 20
th
 century, during the 
dynamic period following the recovery from II world war, diffusion mechanisms were stronger than 
they have been since 1980. This was because a set of technologies developed in the early 20
th
 century 
based on mechanical engineering and electrical power became fully mature by the end of the war. As 
they gradually standardised, they underwent a long process of de-agglomeration, which benefited 
less-developed regions and activated inter-regional convergence. Decentralisation to regions with 
lower land and labour costs was facilitated by a fall in transportation and trade costs.  
In contrast, during the current wave of technological change and globalisation of the world 
economy, dating from the technology shocks of the 1980s and the transformations of the pre-existing 
geo-political and economic cold war-order from the end of the 1980s, such convergence mechanisms 
have been weak by historical standards. Even as the agglomerated urban activities of the new 
economy are maturing, they become both very lean in terms of job creation and tend to leapfrog over 
Europe’s less-developed regions to emerging and developing countries. As we have pointed out, this 
structural situation is only weakly compensated by knowledge (and hence entrepreneurship) diffusion 
and labour migration. Consequently, as the Economist stressed, theories that hold that agglomeration-
driven economic development produce sufficient spatial and social trickle-down mechanisms are not 
capable of explaining the evident rise and persistence of inter-regional inequality in today’s EU.  
 
4.2 SHOULD WE FOCUS ON EQUITY INSTEAD?  
In contrast to the agglomeration-driven vision of economic growth from New Economic Geography, 
the neo-classical growth theories underscore the eventual appearance of diminishing returns to spatial 
concentration. There has been no shortage of attention in urban economic research given to the 
potentially negative externalities related to growth in agglomerations: congestion, pollution and high 
land costs have featured prominently (Fujita and Krugman, 2004). In the standard neo-classical 
formulation, concentration costs naturally generate the de-agglomeration forces necessary to even out 
the landscape of development, in either real incomes or total utility terms (Glaeser, 2008).  
However, what is one of the most prominent negative externality has been largely overlooked (or 
dismissed as a temporary stage in the quest for greater aggregate economic efficiency): rising 
territorial inequality. As seen in the evidence presented in Section 2 above, within-country inequality 
in the EU has continued to grow (Rodríguez-Pose, 1999; Puga, 2002; Charron, 2016). The 
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consequences of such inequality are economic, social and political: in Europe, it is provoking 
increasingly virulent societal tensions. Uneven development has been a key factor behind the rise in 
populism all over Europe (Ballas et al., 2017) and has been a fundamental driver in the British vote in 
favour of Brexit (McCann, 2016; Jessop, 2017; MacKinnon, 2017; Toly, 2017). Poorer regions have 
growing social, health and behavioural pathologies that become ingrained and difficult to improve 
(Chetty et al., 2014; Autor et al., 2017). In particular, the uptake of education in less favoured regions 
can be unresponsive to supply.  
Traditional policy responses to persistent territorial inequality or underdevelopment have 
emphasised territorial ‘equity,’ and this type of approach is harshly criticised by tenants of 
agglomeration-driven approaches to economic development. The term ‘equity’ is polysemic, but we 
take it here to signify approaches aimed at redistributing economic activity, under the assumption that 
such policy-driven redistribution can be achieved and that it can elicit income convergence among 
regions. This definition of ‘equity-based’ policies implies some kind of forced ‘spatial rebalancing’, 
whereby the development of low- and middle-income regions is a consequence of attracting 
development away from high-income areas (Martin, 2015). Many national governments around the 
world – from the 1950s through the 1970s – attempted such redistributive policy, in the form of 
mandatory locational controls designed to provoke de-agglomeration, or tried to create growth poles 
through massive state investment to foster agglomerations in less-developed regions. But this form 
“of spatial planning became strewn with failed or abandoned growth-pole strategies” (Parr, 2015: 
386).  
In the past, such policies have generally been ineffective in combating market forces for spatial 
concentration. For example, the French Plan never succeeded in reducing the share of GDP and 
population of Greater Paris. The health of outlying regions in France during the Trentes Glorieuses 
was not based on a reallocation of production away from the Île-de-France, but rather on the nature of 
the economy in the post-war period, where routine manufacturing production still generated 
considerable high-wage employment (Ancien, 2005). Spatial redistribution-cum-equity policies have 
also been weak in stimulating endogenous development in other parts of Europe, such as the Italian 
Mezzogiorno (Polverari, 2013) or, more recently, in the UK (Martin, 2015). In their place, however, 
are more recent notions of redistributive spatial-equity policies, consisting of public investments 
directed towards less-favoured regions, as well as people-based subsidies based on a formula that 
favours certain categories of lower-income populations and, by extension, lower-income regions.  
 
5. POLICY: BEYOND THE PLACE-PEOPLE DIVIDE 
Following the conventions of theory, development policies can be divided into two types, underlining 
either efficiency or equity. So-called spatially-blind frameworks focus on efficiency, in the form of 
maximising agglomeration, which they assume boosts overall output. These policies, however, offer 
little to address the problems of declining and lagging-behind areas, restricting themselves to 
temporary compensation to such regions as a waystation to out-migration and reconversion (Pike et 
al., 2007; 2017). Such spatially-blind (often euphemistically labelled people-based) policy approaches 
have been advocated on the assumption that, by helping people to become skilled or entrepreneurial, 
geographical labour mobility and knowledge spillovers will counterbalance the negative mechanisms 
of agglomeration, leading to the diffusion of innovation and territorial convergence. 
The alternative type of policy approach stresses coordinated place-based support, as a means 
toward achieving inter-territorial equity. This type of approach rests on the assumption that less-
developed areas can always catch up to wealthier regions, if provided with the right endowments. 
However, as we argued above, empirical evidence shows that, more often than not, there is labour 
mobility away from assisted regions and limited innovation diffusion to them. Such strong market 
mechanisms would render much place-based policy ineffective. Due to persistent out-migration and 
low local opportunities, a process of social marginalisation – with deteriorating family incomes, low 
educational attainment, and growing social pathologies – can be set into motion in these regions, 
compounding and making more persistent their poor economic fundamentals. In this context, place-
based policies frequently function more as social rather than economic development policies.  
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Too much focus on efficiency through agglomeration may therefore enhance territorial inequity 
(which, in turn, undermines efficiency), while too much focus on equity through place-based support 
(without development) undermines overall economic efficiency. Hence, there is a need to pursue 
efficiency and equity simultaneously and neither spatially-blind nor place-based policies, on their 
own, are capable of doing so.  
On the basis of this discussion, a third type of development strategy is required. Rather than the 
two extremes of much inherited theory – a mechanical notion of ‘equity’ through territorial 
redistribution, or an ‘all-agglomeration’ strategy – the alternative is what we call ‘distributed 
development’. This term refers to an innovative, place-sensitive development policy approach that 
counters the potentially negative spiral of geographically restricted development in three ways. Its 
overall goal is for more and more regions to have non-routine (innovative) functions in their economic 
mix. We maintain that economic development policy should be both sensitive to the need for 
agglomeration and the need for it to occur in as many places as possible, because agglomeration can 
maximize the total future innovation output of the economy in the aggregate (Duranton and Puga, 
2001). At first glance, this claim seems to be opposed to the finding that efficiency and agglomeration 
go together. But dynamic efficiency, or maximizing productivity over the long run, is different from a 
snapshot of productivity maximization at any moment in time. Future innovation is inherently 
uncertain, both in its content and in the contexts (social and spatial) from which it emerges, even if 
existing agglomerations often have strong ‘learning’ properties. Although economic development 
officials dream of being able to define long-term strategies, they usually fail in this task. Predicting 
scientific discoveries, technological breakthroughs, and all the tweaks that transform our lives is nigh 
impossible. Moreover, successful entrepreneurs make their own luck, adjusting and adapting to 
survive. Instead of being the result of far-sighted planning, entrepreneurial activity is messy, adaptive 
and unpredictable. The biggest problem is that it is difficult to anticipate which technologies will pay-
off. By contrast, the crucial role of ‘second-mover advantages’ and ‘technology latecomers’ for the 
enhancement of localised entrepreneurial capabilities and structural change has long been emphasised 
(von Tunzelmann and Wang, 2007). Hence, policy for long-term innovation and productivity growth 
needs to be based on hedging bets by promoting broad-based capacities for social, institutional and 
business innovation, as well as mastering second-mover processes that diffuse innovation.  
The geographical correlate of this fundamental point is for economic development strategy to 
enable as many actors and regions as possible to participate productively in the economy in a way that 
their capacities can expand. The gateway conditions to such participation are improving the quality of 
life and well-being of all, which is the minimum for ensuring that agents have the capabilities and 
freedom to achieve this. Diversity of capable agents and territories is the most powerful tool for 
success in the open probability game of innovation and economic creativity (Kemeny and Cooke, 
2017; Feldman and Storper, 2018). In the light of this, policymakers cannot afford to wait for perfect 
predictability and an error-free world. As Kline and Moretti (2014: 634) conclude: “Second best may, 
in practice, be very attractive relative to the status quo.” And second best may be first best in the long 
run, if it promotes those widespread capacities that are the basis for flourishing in ways that cannot be 
predicted in the short-run. Moreover, by distributing the open-ended capabilities for future 
development across as many territories as possible, and hence reaching as much of the population as 
possible, not only will the probability for prosperity of places be enhanced, but so will the potential 
for more fluid migration of people to opportunity and the avoidance of spatial traps for them.  
 
5.1 INSTITUTIONS: A KEY OBSTACLE TO DISTRIBUTED DEVELOPMENT 
The missing link in development intervention is institutional quality. Institutions are the rules of the 
game in a society, and they can be understood in the broad sense as including formal organisations, 
government and laws, as well as a variety of informal norms, conventions and collective beliefs 
(North, 1990: 477; Alesina and Guiliano, 2015).  It has now been widely demonstrated that 
institutions play a key role in determining the development potential of any territory (Acemoglu and 
Johnson 2012). Many institutions are place-based and place-specific.  
16 
 
Recent research has demonstrated that weak institutions, in general, and poor-quality 
government, in particular, constitute a crucial obstacle to development (Rodríguez-Pose, 2013). Poor 
institutions affect essential growth-promoting factors, such as the returns on European Cohesion 
policies (Rodríguez-Pose and Garcilazo, 2015), competitiveness (Annoni and Dijkstra, 2013), and 
undermine entrepreneurship (Nistotskaya et al., 2015) and the capacity to innovate (Rodríguez-Pose 
and Di Cataldo, 2015). Moreover, poor institutions – ineffective local governments, limits in voice 
and accountability as well as corruption – steer public investment towards projects with dubious 
economic and/or social returns (Crescenzi et al., 2016) and have heavily shaped the location of 
multinationals’ productive capital in the EU (Ascani et al., 2016). 
Although measuring institutions is notoriously difficult, it has become increasingly clear that, in 
the case of Europe, many regions and cities which are either lagging behind or declining have weaker 
‘good’ institutions – such as those that promote entrepreneurship and confidence in the future – and 
often have more robust ‘bad’ institutions – such as those that promote rent-seeking, corruption, or lack 
of confidence – than their more developed counterparts (Charron et al., 2014). This has led to a 
proliferation of white elephants that may have responded to short-term electoral or private gains, but 
which, in the medium-term, have contributed little to addressing the lack of opportunity in lagging 
and declining areas.  
It follows that if institutional quality cannot be improved, regions will not capture waves of 
economic possibilities as they unfold. While a country like Estonia has witnessed rapid improvements 
in government quality associated with fast economic growth, a dearth of institutional enhancements in 
southern Italy or in Greece has truncated their economic development prospects. Good institutions are 
also essential for the promotion of low-skilled jobs and for reducing social exclusion (Di Cataldo and 
Rodríguez-Pose, 2017). Improving government capacity, enhancing transparency and accountability, 
and tackling endemic corruption are among the institutional reforms required to overcome 
development traps. Such reforms, though noted in classics of under-development theory and research, 
have received relatively little regional policy attention in the EU.  
 
5.2 PLACE-SENSITIVE DISTRIBUTED DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
In light of the discussion above, an approach that goes beyond the people-place policy divide is 
needed. Such a framework would aim to distribute development as widely as possible and maximise 
development outcomes everywhere, while eschewing any mechanical goal of equity-as-convergence. 
It is place-sensitive, rather than place-based, in the sense that the specific starting point and mix of 
instruments needed to distribute development will be different for each group of economies. We label 
such an approach ‘place-sensitive distributed development policy’ (PSDDP). In what follows, we 
illustrate the notion of place-sensitive distributed development by briefly considering each group of 
regional economies.  
  Place-sensitive strategy for very-high-income regions: Regions in the VH group are 
challenged to maintain their specialisation in high-wage activities in the face of a changing wider 
landscape of comparative advantages. Specifically, they must out-run two forces: one is that high-
wage activities at one moment in time may become progressively more widespread, routinized and 
hence permit the arrival of imitators who lower their wages. The second factor is that as innovative 
sectors mature they spread out geographically, meaning that leading regions no longer have a lock on 
them. The richest regions can thus only maintain their prosperity through sectoral succession 
(replacing old activities with new ones on the technological frontier) or by continuing to push the 
edge of innovation.  
Place-sensitive strategy for high-income regions: The issues for the H group are different more 
in degree than nature from those of the VH group; the H economies are more vulnerable from below 
to having their advantages overlap with the medium-income regions because their technological 
distance and innovation-intensity have smaller gaps to much cheaper regions. The H group is also 
vulnerable to standardisation of the products they make (product cycles, maturity), because they are 
often specialised in sectors or tasks that are more technologically mature than those of the VH 
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regions. But this need not be fatal: it depends on the capacity of the H group’s firms to generate 
innovations within their areas of economic specialisation or to move to areas linked within the 
economy. A key way that H regions do so is through incremental innovation allowing them to 
dominate the high-quality segments and upstream tasks in rather mature industries. 
Both the VH group and H group contain global metropolitan centres and dynamic city-regions. 
For both, place-sensitive approaches must incorporate some common elements: cutting-edge 
technology strategies, science-led and R&D-based innovation, outward internationalization of both 
upstream and downstream production functions (e.g. R&D, logistics), business-university research 
collaboration, artistic creativity, forward-looking postgraduate education, environmental and anti-
congestion measures, high openness to international flows of human capital, strong synergies between 
public and private actors in supporting long-term investments in new and uncertain technological 
areas, and urban environments that nurture cultural and ethnic diversity.  
Place-sensitive strategy for the low-income regions: At the other end of the spectrum, low-
income regions suffer from limited skills and assets in technology and organizations and relatively 
low-cost. As economic activities become more routinized and seek out lower cost locations, L regions 
may offer just this. Some L regions can launch development by making land and labour available at 
low cost – this was classically known as the ‘advantage of backwardness’ (Gerschenkron, 1957) 
However, in the early 21
st
 century, the routinised activities that may undergo dispersal to these regions 
through European or global value chains economise on labour through capital intensification, 
potentially generating ‘premature deindustrialisation’ (Rodrik, 2016). This can be combined with 
ongoing offshoring of the most labour-intensive activities to developing countries. Hence, the 
advantages of backwardness are limited and fragile in today’s world. Furthermore, the types of 
backwardness in EU regions take a wide variety of forms, with important differences between the 
southern and eastern EU peripheries: emerging industrial regions in eastern EU sharply differ from 
the relatively disconnected corporatist peripheries of southern Europe. 
L-group regions face two additional challenges. The first is whether they can mobilise their 
natural advantages by making their labour and land available at low cost and high efficiency. This 
depends on having connectivity, functioning state capacity, and adequate labour-force skills. L 
regions therefore have no natural advantage of backwardness; they must transform the underlying 
conditions in ways that make them attractive. The problem is that many L cities and regions are not 
particularly attractive for business. Their key supply factor – labour – is not fully mobilised, as 
reflected in low labour-force participation or reservation-wage levels that exceed their relative 
productivity. In addition, they generally have limited intra-regional and external networks and are 
unlikely to contain specialised clusters or industrial districts. Most face institutional weaknesses or 
dysfunctions in government and governance. Finally, although accessibility has improved through 
investment in transport infrastructure, lagging-behind regions remain far better connected to core 
cities than to other less-developed areas.  
In the absence of effective place-sensitive strategies, European integration can accelerate talent- 
and youth-loss to higher-income places, activating a negative demographic dynamic, which will 
further undermine their potential for economic and social creativity. If their populations age due to 
out-migration of the young, they will also face a long-term decline in labour-force participation. All 
these forces may combine to limit their size and ability to offer scale in infrastructure, logistics and 
supply. All in all, the EU’s low-income regions have a narrow window in the current context in which 
to exploit their initial advantages and move into the middle-income group; effectively, they are in a 
race against the clock.  
Winning this race requires a broad range of activities: investment in infrastructure, with an accent 
on intra-periphery connections; active labour market policies and reforms to increase labour-force 
participation, particularly among women and young; creating start-ups and the return of well-educated 
human capital to modernise industry and local governance structures; education reforms ensuring 
quality at primary and secondary levels and greater emphasis on foreign languages; technical and 
vocational training and retraining; job-skills matching based on the use of both qualifications and 
skills; university-industry linkages to provide the skills required by the local production structure and 
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for innovation absorption; identification of complementarities across existing productive capacity (i.e. 
across agriculture, manufacturing and services) to create ‘regional integrated policy platforms’ 
(Cooke, 2007); and support to social networks and cultures of risk-taking and openness. 
Improvements in government – from tackling red-tape and promoting e-government to encouraging 
transparency and accountability and eradicating corruption – along with strengthening civil society 
should be central to and cut across all the components of place-sensitive development strategies for 
such regions.  
Place-sensitive strategies for middle-income regions: In international development economics, 
there is a key development bottleneck known as the ‘middle income trap’. Successful low-income 
countries can enjoy high growth rates for a certain number of years, before experiencing a long-term 
slowdown (Kharas and Kohli, 2011; Eichengreen et al., 2013; Vivarelli, 2016). This is because their 
labour costs rise to the point where other regions become more attractive for labour-intensive or low-
skill activities. Yet at the same time, such countries lack the advantages of richer countries in terms of 
productivity, organisations and business ecosystems, infrastructure, home markets and, critically, 
inventiveness and skills. They are trapped between two worlds. Thus, M regions have some of the 
most delicate knife-edge developmental challenges: they are neither as productive nor as innovative as 
the high- and very-high-income regions, but their labour and land prices are higher than those in low-
income regions.  
Moving up requires higher investment per worker than in the early stages of development, as 
more skills are needed. Raising firm quality also demands more investment in hardware and orgware. 
In fact, a rising share of savings and capital formation is required to invest in the creation of a growth 
process that relies on inputs – technology, education, infrastructure, urbanisation – that imply higher 
unit investment costs compared to the low-income phase of economic development. This investment 
needs arise in tandem with the natural demand on the part of the population for greater per capita 
consumption, as the collective reward for their hard work in the low-income stage.  
Europe has many such regions and different types can be distinguished: traditional slow-growing 
industrial peripheries, ageing and declining industrial areas, and consumer-oriented amenity-based 
regions with weak tradeable specialisations. In some of the M group slow-growing regions of 
southern Europe, poor-quality government, pervasive corruption, collusion and lack of trust are more 
of a barrier for development than asset shortage. The key goal has to be increasing the productivity of 
individuals and systems by enhancing education and labour-force participation, and upgrading firms’ 
capacity. The historical aversion to risk, poor entrepreneurship and rent-seeking behaviour through 
the public sector all require particular attention.  Indeed, many such regions do not suffer from a 
shortage of educational opportunity (supply), but rather from a poor rate of uptake of education, 
suggesting that incentives and motivation are missing. Institutional improvement, and not just 
education and training expansion, is crucial to improving the incentives for skilling, entrepreneurship 
and heightened hopes and expectations.  
Some ageing and declining industrial areas in France, northern Italy and northern Spain have 
good-quality government but suffer from skill-mismatch to the current economy, as well as degraded 
amenity and residential conditions, combined with deepening social problems due to the despair 
attendant on long-term decline, and higher barriers to outmigration. Yet their reservation wages – i.e. 
the lowest wage rate at which a worker will take a specific job – make them poor candidates for 
competition with low-income regions, whether in Europe or abroad. Though these are difficult 
conditions to overcome, industrial reconversion in Scandinavia and in certain parts of East Germany 
give reason for hope. A place-sensitive strategy for these regions would stress significant investments 
in re-skilling (along the lines of the Danish flexicurity system), combined with increasing both the 
attractiveness of selected inward capital flows and participation in global production and value chains 
networks, establishing knowledge links through university-industry problem-solving collaboration, 
and actively promoting internationalisation for innovation projects. In such regions, fraying social 
capital needs to be repaired, through re-creation of networks of workers, government, universities, 
entrepreneurs and investors to overcome the mistrust that comes from historically stratified conflict-
ridden class relations inherited from the period of their initial industrialisation. 
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6. CONCLUSION: THE DISTINCTIVE CONTRIBUTION OF THE PLACE-
SENSITIVE DISTRIBUTED DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK 
There are many ideas for policy reform currently embodied in the ongoing updating of EU economic 
development frameworks. The Lisbon Agenda and the Europe 2020 Strategy have been intended to 
make Europe the world’s leading innovation economy; smart specialisation strategies for regions 
correctly emphasise that every economy requires core specialisations that enable it to trade on growth-
stimulating terms with the rest of the world (McCann and Ortega-Argilés, 2015); structural funds 
promote more efficient connectivity and infrastructure improvements; commitment to basic European 
principles of freedom and human rights symbiotically links, ultimately, to good, transparent and non-
corrupt government.  
The place-sensitive distributed development approach we argue for here is consistent with all 
these frameworks, but modifies them in two ways. The first is based on realism about what factor 
mobility in the context of European integration can do for spreading wealth. While factor mobility is 
important, there are such significant agglomeration effects generated by it that it will not, in and of 
itself, spread prosperity sufficiently. European integration, moreover, tends to make knowledge and 
highly-skilled people concentrate in the winning places, creating spatial traps for others. The second 
limitation follows directly from this analytical framework: Europe-wide place-neutral or general-
purpose policies cannot, in and of themselves, address the problems of spatially uneven development.  
This is why policies must be place-sensitive in the way we have defined. The specific mix and 
weight of instruments need to be tailored to the structural prospects of different kinds of European 
regions. Place-sensitivity modifies the near-term way in which smart specialisation, structural funds, 
innovation strategies and institutional reforms are undertaken in the different regional groups. The 
overarching concept thus requires context-dependent integrations of the instruments to fit the near- 
and middle-term realistic prospects of different groups and sub-groups, knowing that these prospects 
and challenges are different for each of them. This pattern of divergent development is not a simple 
core-periphery geography, but rather one of structurally different groups of regional economies.  
 At the same time, many existing place-based approaches have become mostly band-aids for 
failing economic processes, as they do not mobilise the under-utilised human and other resources of 
the less favoured regions. With the dis-aggregation of development realities that we presented above, 
we draw a distinction between place-based and place-sensitivity as a theoretical concept behind 
policy. The ultimate goal of place-sensitive distributed development is to combat the under-utilisation 
of regions’ people and resources, so as to distribute development more widely. Unlike standard all-
agglomeration and all-mobility models, our theoretical framework aims to maximise the aggregate 
potential of the EU economy by un-tapping the potential output of all its regions, taking account of 
barriers to people mobility and to spreading employment, and spatial traps that have emerged. We 
placed particular emphasis on the middle-income trap, which is widespread in the EU’s regions. 
Indeed, this represents perhaps the hardest challenge for policy: identifying M regions’ actual needs 
and potential opportunities between those of the most successful regions, which are indeed sources of 
wealth for the whole EU economy, and the large and diverse group of the more disconnected and 
disillusioned peripheries.  
We limited ourselves to establishing the case for a place-sensitive distributed development 
approach through theory and evidence and policy critique and reformulation in this article. Hence, we 
have not gone into detail concerning how such an approach for each group should precisely 
coordinate top-down mission-oriented measures and bottom-up capability-building programmes, as 
well as integrate tools across different policy areas, and set up the metrics for success and failure that 
place-sensitive approaches require. That is a task best left for another article.  
By redefining the basis for how to deal with uneven development at the centre of the policy 
effort, Europe can start to redress some of the economic, social and political challenges which have 
gradually eroded its capacity to lead at the global scale and which have become all too evident as a 
source of social division and political disenchantment in recent years.   
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Table A1: List of overperforming and underperforming regions 
  
Regional GDP per head, 
2014 as EU Index 
National GDP per head, 
2014 as EU Index 
Overperforming NUTS 2 regions (regional GDP per head > national GDP per head) 
DE60 Hamburg 206 126 
SK01 Bratislavský kraj 186 77 
DE21 Oberbayern 179 126 
FR10 Île de France 178 107 
SE11 Stockholm 172 123 
UKM5 North-eastern Scotland 164 109 
BE00 Brussels and regions covered by its commuting zone 163 118 
NL11 Groningen 163 131 
DE71 Darmstadt 163 126 
DE11 Stuttgart 162 126 
DE50 Bremen 161 126 
DK01 Hovedstaden 157 125 
NL31 Utrecht 154 131 
NL00 
Amsterdam and regions covered by its commuting 
zone 153 131 
AT32 Salzburg 152 129 
IE02 Southern and Eastern 150 134 
UKJ1 Berkshire, Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire 149 109 
ITH1 Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano/Bozen 144 96 
FI1B Helsinki-Uusimaa 144 110 
UK00 London and regions covered by its commuting zone 141 109 
DE12 Karlsruhe 140 126 
AT34 Vorarlberg 139 129 
AT33 Tirol 138 129 
BE21 Prov. Antwerpen 138 118 
FI20 Åland 137 110 
DE91 Braunschweig 136 126 
DE14 Tübingen 136 126 
DE25 Mittelfranken 135 126 
DEA1 Düsseldorf 134 126 
NL41 Noord-Brabant 134 131 
ITC2 Valle d'Aosta/Vallée d'Aoste 133 96 
AT00 Vienna and regions covered by its commuting zone 133 129 
DEA2 Köln 132 126 
AT31 Oberösterreich 132 129 
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NL33 Zuid-Holland 131 131 
RO32 Bucuresti-Ilo 129 55 
DE23 Oberpfalz 128 126 
DE26 Unterfranken 127 126 
ITC4 Lombardia 126 96 
ES30 Comunidad de Madrid 125 91 
CZ00 Praha and regions covered by its commuting zone 124 84 
UKD6 Cheshire 123 109 
ITH2 Provincia Autonoma di Trento 123 96 
ES21 País Vasco 119 91 
ITH5 Emilia-Romagna 117 96 
UKJ2 Surrey, East and West Sussex 115 109 
ITI4 Lazio 114 96 
ES22 Comunidad Foral de Navarra 113 91 
UKK1 Gloucestershire, Wiltshire and Bristol/Bath area 112 109 
UKJ3 Hampshire and Isle of Wight 112 109 
PL12 Mazowieckie 108 68 
ITH3 Veneto 108 96 
ES51 Cataluña 108 91 
HU10 Közép-Magyarország 107 68 
PT17 Área Metropolitana de Lisboa 106 78 
ITI1 Toscana 104 96 
ITC3 Liguria 104 96 
ITH4 Friuli-Venezia Giulia 101 96 
ES24 Aragón 100 91 
ITC1 Piemonte 100 96 
ES23 La Rioja 100 91 
EL30 Attiki 99 72 
SI04 Zahodna Slovenija 98 82 
ES53 Illes Balears 95 91 
EL42 Notio Aigaio 80 72 
PL51 Dolnoslaskie 76 68 
BG41 Yugozapaden 75 47 
PL41 Wielkopolskie 73 68 
HU22 Nyugat-Dunántúl 71 68 
PL22 Slaskie 70 68 
HR04 Kontinentalna Hrvatska 60 59 
RO42 Vest 58 55 
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Underperforming NUTS 2 regions (regional GDP per head < national GDP per head) 
DE27 Schwaben 125 126 
DE13 Freiburg 122 126 
DEA4 Detmold 122 126 
DE22 Niederbayern 121 126 
DE92 Hannover 121 126 
DEB3 Rheinhessen-Pfalz 119 126 
DEC0 Saarland 119 126 
SE23 Västsverige 118 123 
DE73 Kassel 118 126 
AT22 Steiermark 116 129 
BE25 Prov. West-Vlaanderen 115 118 
DE24 Oberfranken 114 126 
SE33 Övre Norrland 114 123 
DEA5 Arnsberg 113 126 
DK03 Syddanmark 112 125 
DK04 Midtjylland 112 125 
DE94 Weser-Ems 110 126 
NL22 Gelderland 110 131 
NL42 Limburg (NL) 109 131 
DEA3 Münster 109 126 
DE72 Gießen 109 126 
BE23 Prov. Oost-Vlaanderen 108 118 
AT21 Kärnten 108 129 
SE32 Mellersta Norrland 107 123 
DK05 Nordjylland 107 125 
NL21 Overijssel 106 131 
DEB1 Koblenz 106 126 
DE00 Berlin and regions covered by its commuting zone 106 126 
FR71 Rhône-Alpes 106 107 
SE12 Östra Mellansverige 106 123 
SE22 Sydsverige 105 123 
DEF0 Schleswig-Holstein 104 126 
SE21 Småland med öarna 104 123 
DED5 Leipzig 103 126 
FR82 Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur 102 107 
UKH1 East Anglia 101 109 
NL34 Zeeland 100 131 
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SE31 Norra Mellansverige 99 123 
DEB2 Trier 99 126 
FI19 Länsi-Suomi 99 110 
UKM2 Eastern Scotland 99 109 
BE22 Prov. Limburg (BE) 98 118 
UKE2 North Yorkshire 98 109 
UKG1 Herefordshire, Worcestershire and Warwickshire 97 109 
FI1C Etelä-Suomi 97 110 
FR42 Alsace 97 107 
FR62 Midi-Pyrénées 96 107 
UKF2 Leicestershire, Rutland and Northamptonshire 96 109 
FR51 Pays de la Loire 95 107 
DED2 Dresden 95 126 
UKD1 Cumbria 94 109 
NL13 Drenthe 94 131 
FR21 Champagne-Ardenne 93 107 
UKM6 Highlands and Islands 93 109 
NL12 Friesland (NL) 93 131 
FR23 Haute-Normandie 93 107 
ITI3 Marche 92 96 
FR61 Aquitaine 92 107 
UKD3 Greater Manchester 92 109 
FI1D Pohjois- ja Itä-Suomi 91 110 
UKM3 South Western Scotland 91 109 
UKE4 West Yorkshire 91 109 
UKL2 East Wales 90 109 
UKK2 Dorset and Somerset 90 109 
FR26 Bourgogne 90 107 
FR83 Corse 89 107 
AT11 Burgenland (AT) 89 129 
FR52 Bretagne 88 107 
IE01 Border, Midland and Western 88 134 
FR24 Centre 88 107 
DEG0 Thüringen 88 126 
DE93 Lüneburg 88 126 
UKJ4 Kent 88 109 
DED4 Chemnitz 87 126 
UKF1 Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire 87 109 
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ITI2 Umbria 87 96 
DEE0 Sachsen-Anhalt 87 126 
FR53 Poitou-Charentes 87 107 
BE33 Prov. Liège 87 118 
UKG3 West Midlands 86 109 
MT00 Malta 86 86 
ES41 Castilla y León 86 91 
UKK4 Devon 85 109 
DK02 Sjælland 85 125 
FR72 Auvergne 85 107 
FR25 Basse-Normandie 85 107 
FR30 Nord-Pas-de-Calais 85 107 
DE80 Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 84 126 
ITF1 Abruzzo 84 96 
UKC2 Northumberland and Tyne and Wear 84 109 
BE35 Prov. Namur 83 118 
UKE1 East Yorkshire and Northern Lincolnshire 83 109 
ES13 Cantabria 82 91 
UKG2 Shropshire and Staffordshire 82 109 
UKD4 Lancashire 82 109 
UKN0 Northern Ireland 82 109 
UKD7 Merseyside 81 109 
UKF3 Lincolnshire 81 109 
FR81 Languedoc-Roussillon 81 107 
ES12 Principado de Asturias 80 91 
ES52 Comunidad Valenciana 80 91 
FR63 Limousin 80 107 
ES11 Galicia 80 91 
FR41 Lorraine 79 107 
CZ06 Jihovýchod 79 84 
FR22 Picardie 78 107 
ES70 Canarias 78 91 
PT15 Algarve 78 78 
FR43 Franche-Comté 77 107 
FRA2 Martinique 77 107 
BE34 Prov. Luxembourg (BE) 76 118 
BE32 Prov. Hainaut 76 118 
UKE3 South Yorkshire 76 109 
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CZ03 Jihozápad 76 84 
ES63 Ciudad Autónoma de Ceuta 76 91 
UKK3 Cornwall and Isles of Scilly 75 109 
ITF2 Molise 75 96 
ES62 Región de Murcia 75 91 
UKC1 Tees Valley and Durham 74 109 
PT30 Região Autónoma da Madeira 73 78 
FRA1 Guadeloupe 73 107 
ITG2 Sardegna 72 96 
SK02 Západné Slovensko 72 77 
ES42 Castilla-La Mancha 72 91 
PT20 Região Autónoma dos Açores 71 78 
CZ08 Moravskoslezsko 70 84 
PT18 Alentejo 70 78 
CZ07 Strední Morava 70 84 
FRA4 La Réunion 70 107 
CZ05 Severovýchod 70 84 
ITF5 Basilicata 69 96 
UKL1 West Wales and The Valleys 69 109 
SI03 Vzhodna Slovenija 68 82 
ES64 Ciudad Autónoma de Melilla 68 91 
ES61 Andalucía 67 91 
PT16 Centro (PT) 67 78 
EL62 Ionia Nisia 67 72 
EL53 Dytiki Makedonia 66 72 
PT11 Norte 65 78 
PL63 Pomorskie 64 68 
PL11 Lódzkie 63 68 
ES43 Extremadura 63 91 
EL43 Kriti 63 72 
ITF4 Puglia 63 96 
CZ04 Severozápad 63 84 
ITG1 Sicilia 62 96 
EL64 Sterea Ellada 61 72 
HU21 Közép-Dunántúl 61 68 
SK03 Stredné Slovensko 61 77 
ITF3 Campania 61 96 
PL21 Malopolskie 60 68 
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ITF6 Calabria 59 96 
FRA3 Guyane 58 107 
EL65 Peloponnisos 58 72 
EL41 Voreio Aigaio 57 72 
PL43 Lubuskie 57 68 
PL42 Zachodniopomorskie 57 68 
HR03 Jadranska Hrvatska 57 59 
EL52 Kentriki Makedonia 56 72 
PL61 Kujawsko-Pomorskie 55 68 
EL61 Thessalia 55 72 
PL52 Opolskie 55 68 
EL63 Dytiki Ellada 54 72 
SK04 Východné Slovensko 53 77 
RO12 Centru 52 55 
EL54 Ipeiros 51 72 
EL51 Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki 50 72 
RO22 Sud-Est 50 55 
PL33 Swietokrzyskie 49 68 
PL34 Podlaskie 49 68 
PL62 Warminsko-Mazurskie 48 68 
PL32 Podkarpackie 48 68 
RO11 Nord-Vest 48 55 
HU33 Dél-Alföld 47 68 
PL31 Lubelskie 47 68 
HU23 Dél-Dunántúl 45 68 
RO31 Sud - Muntenia 43 55 
HU32 Észak-Alföld 43 68 
HU31 Észak-Magyarország 42 68 
RO41 Sud-Vest Oltenia 41 55 
BG34 Yugoiztochen 40 47 
BG33 Severoiztochen 39 47 
RO21 Nord-Est 34 55 
BG32 Severen tsentralen 34 47 
BG42 Yuzhen tsentralen 32 47 
FRA5 Mayotte 31 107 
BG31 Severozapaden 30 47 
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Map A1: GDP per head (2013) vs. population growth rate (2001-13)
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Map A2: GDP per head EU index (2013) vs. employment change (2001-13)
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Map A3: GDP per head EU index (2013) vs. employment rate (2015)
 
  
35 
 
Map A4: GDP per head (2013) vs. growth rate of GDP per head (2001-2013)
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Map A5: GDP per head EU index (2013) vs. employment change in industry (2001-14)
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Map A6: GDP per head EU index (2013) vs. employment change in services (2001-14)
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Map A7: GDP per head EU index (2013) vs. patent applications per million inhabitants (2010-11)
 
 
 
 
